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The past decade has witnessed the rise in popularity of organizations
and political parties founded on the extreme nationalism and populism that
characterized the interwar period’s fascist and Nazi parties. These
organizations have become known as the “alt-right” and include white
supremacists, neo-Nazis, neo-fascists, and other extreme right-wing fringe
groups. Extreme right-wing political parties have also enjoyed electoral
victories while promulgating xenophobia and hatred based on race, religion,
ethnicity, nationality, and sexual orientation. This article examines the
resurgence of such extreme right-wing political parties and the relationship
between right-wing extremism, political parties, and terrorism. The goal of
this article is to shift the discussion from one of political analysis of rightwing extremism to one of legal evaluation of the activities involved within
the ambit of the recent advances in the criminalization of terrorism. Could
the mobilization of extreme right-wing political parties be classified as
terrorism? This article begins to answer this question by assessing the
definitional problem of terrorism and critically analyzing the most recent
legislative developments in the EU. The article focuses on the uneasy
relationship between the legal nature of political parties and the crime of
terrorism. It then applies insights from this debate to the specific case of
Greece’s popular extreme right-wing political party: Golden Dawn. It
discusses Golden Dawn’s development and political mobilization under the
framework of terrorist statutes and argues in favor of a constitutional
interpretation that gives political parties the necessary legal personality in
order to incur collective criminal liability for such activities.
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INTRODUCTION
The past decade has been marked by a steep revival and increased
popularity across the globe of organizations and political parties founded on
ideals rooted in the extreme nationalism and populism that characterized the
interwar period’s fascist and Nazi parties. The United Nations SecretaryGeneral underlined that neo-fascism and neo-Nazism are gaining ground in
many countries especially in Europe.1 The “electoral victories of extreme
right parties advocating xenophobia, attacks on ethnic, national and religious
minorities, and racial or ethnic purity in the countries where they are active”
demonstrate this trend.2 Most recently, the US has witnessed a similar reenergization of groups that make up what has become known as the “altright” and include white supremacists, neo-Nazis, neo-fascists, and other
extreme right-wing fringe groups.3
The sudden popularity of these parties within local or national
government coupled with the varied and self-selective terminology used to
1. Press Release, Secretary-General, at Second World War Exhibition, Calls Resurgent Nazi
Ideologies ‘Cancer That Is Starting to Spread Again’, Stressing ‘Duty’ of Defeating Them, U.N. Press
Release SG/SM/19024 (May 9, 2018).
2. Hans-Georg Betz, The Growing Threat of the Radical Right, in RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 76 (Peter H. Merkel & Leonard Weinberg eds., 2003). See also A. James
Gregor, Fascism’s Philosophy of Violence and the Concept of Terror, in THE MORALITY OF TERRORISM
153–65 (David C. Rapport & Yona Alexander eds., 1982) (describing the violent terrorism committed by
various fascist groups in the twentieth century).
3. Liam Stack, Alt-Right, Alt-Left, Antifa: A Glossary of Extremist Language, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug.
15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/us/politics/alt-left-alt-right-glossary. “The ‘alt-right’ is
a racist, far-right movement based on an ideology of white nationalism and anti-Semitism; “AltRight, THE SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremistfiles/ideology/alt-right. (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). “The Alternative Right, commonly known as the ‘altright,’ is a set of far-right ideologies, groups and individuals whose core belief is that ‘white identity’ is
under attack by multicultural forces using ‘political correctness’ and ‘social justice’ to undermine white
people and ‘their’ civilization.”
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describe, classify, and define them have caused confusion around these
political units’ identities and the nature of the general political phenomenon
of which they are a part. Terms ranging from extreme, far, and radical right,
to populist, nationalist, neo-Nazi, neo-fascist, and alt-right have been used
interchangeably by the organizations and political parties themselves, as well
as by the national constituencies and the media.4 This terminology, however,
is somewhat disorienting. The terms that attach to a political left-right
continuum are situational considering that politically “left” and “right” may
vary from country to country and include issues and trends that even
transcend the left-right binary itself.5 The alternative labels of fascism,
nationalism, and Nazism, are arguably too narrow to encompass the wide
array of movements that fall within the spectrum and are perhaps even
outdated.6 Finally, the alternative concept of ‘hate parties’ in reference to
‘hate crime’ isolates the criminal aspect of the phenomenon from the
potentially wider political context of non-criminal activities.7
This article examines the resurgence of the extreme right-wing political
parties in Europe in general and Greece in particular as well as the
relationship between right-wing extremism, political parties, and terrorism.
The first part of this article explores historical and terminological nuances of
right-wing extremism and argues that right-wing extremism is the product of
a delegitimization process against the political status quo. It further contends
that these new political parties, founded on interwar extreme right
ideologies, are different in their rhetoric and approach towards representative
democracy than their predecessors, making them fundamentally more
threatening to the liberal state. Then, the article moves on to analyze the
potential of these parties’ activities to qualify as terrorist activities. To
achieve this end, the article presents the definitional problem of terrorism
internationally as well as in the European Union (EU) and critically analyzes
the most recent EU Directive on combatting terrorism and its contested
endangerment requirement. The second part of this article focuses on the
uneasy relationship between established political parties and the crime of
terrorism. It applies this debate to the specific case of Greece’s popular
4. Jim Wolfreys, The European Extreme Right in Comparative Perspective, in VARIETIES OF
RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN EUROPE 19, 19 (Andrea Mammone et al. ed., 2013).
5. JONATHAN WHITE, LEFT, RIGHT AND BEYOND: THE PRAGMATICS OF POLITICAL MAPPING, in
LSE ‘EUROPE IN QUESTION’ DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, 2010 5–6 (LEQS Paper No. 24, 2010).
6. See ROGER GRIFFIN, THE NATURE OF FASCISM (1991); Gilbert Allardyce, What Fascism is Not:
Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept, 84 AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 367, 367–89 (1979);
FASCISTS AND CONSERVATIVES (Martin Blinkhorn ed., 1990); RENZO DE FELICE, FASCISM (1976);
RENZO DE FELICE, INTERPRETATIONS OF FASCISM (Brenda H. Everett trans., 1977); FASCISM IN EUROPE
(S.J. Woolf ed., 1981).
7. TERROR FROM THE EXTREME RIGHT (Tore Bjørgo ed., 1995).
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extreme right-wing political party: Golden Dawn. The article discusses
Golden Dawn’s development and political mobilization in relation to
terrorist statutes transposing the recent EU Directive into domestic law and
argues in favor of a constitutional interpretation that gives political parties
the necessary legal personality in order to incur collective criminal liability
for terrorist activities.
PART I
A. The History and Political Ideology of Extreme Right-Wing Parties
Wilhem Heitmeyer describes right-wing extremism as an ideology
rooted in the assertion of a natural inequality between people, coupled with
recognition of violence as a legitimate archetype for political action.8 For
the purposes of this article and for reasons of efficiency, I use the term
“extreme right” as comprising political ideology, activist policies, and the
potentially violent and criminal activity that attach to the extreme right of the
political spectrum.9 One of the modern forms of terrorism is the particular
kind of terrorism produced by right-wing movements adhering to the
politically ideological schools of fascism and Nazism.10 Between the 1920’s
and 1940’s, Europe witnessed an insurgence of such movements with the
Italian fascists and German Nazis succeeding in taking official governmental
power and control over their countries.11 The fascist and Nazi leaders and
ideologues exalted the use of violence as an integral element of governance,
a kind of violence that quickly converted into a form of massive terrorism
that was both targeted and indiscriminate.12 The prewar and interwar fascist
and Nazi parties felt little need to justify the use of violence to their
constituencies. Violence instead was understood and preached as an intrinsic
element of the fascist and Nazi Weltanschauung, or worldview, making it
equally self-evident and necessary, requiring no explanation or

8. Wilhem Heitmeyer, Right-Wing Extremist Violence, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF
VIOLENCE RESEARCH 399, 399–436 (Wilhelm Heitmeyer & John Haganeds., 2003); Wilhem Heitmeyer,
Right-wing terrorism, in ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM 141, 141–53 Tore Bjørgo ed., 2005); see also
Hans-Georg Betz, The Growing Thread of the Radical Right, in RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 74, 74 (Peter H. Merkel & Leonard Weinberg eds., 2003).
9. See Tore Bjørgo, Introduction, in TERROR FROM THE EXTREME RIGHT 1, 1–13 (Tore Bjørgo
ed., 1995).
10. See Ehud Sprinzak, Right Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: The Case of Split
Delegitimization 7(1) TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 17, 17–43 (2007) (analyzing the unique
characteristics of right-wing terrorism).
11. Id. at 23.
12. PETER MERKL, THE MAKING OF A STORMTROOPER 299–305 (1987); ERNST NOLTE, THREE
FACES OF FASCISM 260–63 (1965).
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justification.13 Additionally, their politically and territorially expansive
agendas created “satellite” parties and organizations across Europe, which,
akin to their original counterparts, adopted violence as an essential part of
their political ideology.14
In order to fully understand the current resurgence of the extreme right
in Europe and beyond, it is important to address its ideological foundation.
Ideology represents “a conceptual frame of reference, which provides
criteria for choice and decision by virtue of which the major activities of an
organized community are governed.”15 All ideologies rely on political
axioms for the provision of a conceptual foundation consisting of ideals held
to be self-evident to its adherents.16 Fascism and Nazism are ideologies that
were generated on political axioms in direct opposition to democratic ones
and essentially developed as polemical forms of anti-ideologies. They
developed as a reaction to the modern democratic creed that was based on
liberal individualism and constitutionalism. Fascism and Nazism arrived on
the political scene at a time when liberal democracy was experiencing its
first difficulties and its political parties were seen as dismissive of issues that
certain social groups considered of high importance, often relating to
financial crises, corruption, immigration, and social inclusion.17 The fascist
and Nazi ideologies grew from these circumstances rather than a set of
preceding ideas, owing their appeal to action and mobilization instead of
political doctrine and dogma.18 It is therefore helpful to depart from the
traditional doctrinal approaches to fully comprehend and analyze the ways
in which these political formations function. Instead, we should approach
them with both the circumstantial context of each era in which they came

13. See Betz, supra note 2, at 74–89 (describing the worldview of modern fascist parties).
14. See MARK MAZOWER, HITLER’S EMPIRE: HOW THE NAZIS RULED EUROPE 137–78 (2008)
(describing Hitler’s occupation of eastern Europe).
15. HERBERT KITSCHELT in collaboration with ANTHONY J. MCGANN, THE RADICAL RIGHT IN
WESTERN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 29 (The Univ. of Mich. Press, 1995) citing ZEER
STERNHELL, Fascist Ideology, in FASCISM. A READER’S GUIDE 326 (Walter Laqueur ed.s, 1976).
16. Meindert Fennema, Populist Parties of the Right, in MOVEMENTS OF EXCLUSION: RADICAL
RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN THE WESTERN WORLD 1, 4 (Jens Rydgren ed., 2005). The political axiom of
the democratic ideology is well expressed in the American Declaration of Independence which claims
that “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights”.
The fact that this is indeed a political axiom is shown in the outset of the sentence “we hold these truths
to be self-evident.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
17. See P. Papasarantopoulos, To big bang ths Xrysh Avgis [Golden Dawn’s big bang] 23 THE
BOOKS’ J. 12–19 (2012).
18. ROBERT O. PAXTON, THE ANATOMY OF FASCISM 17 (2005). As Mussolini put it: “the
Democrats of Il Mondo want to know our program? It is to break the bones of the Democrats of Il Mondo.
And the sooner the better”.
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into being as well as the axiomatic sociopolitical references these political
entities have manifested.19
For the fascists and Nazis, social inequality forms the cornerstone of a
political ideology that legitimizes itself by reference to nature. Starting from
the endogenous hierarchical nature of the existing society, these political
entities point to the “natural” plausibility of inborn differences between
people, instilling the social fact of societal inequality with a “moral”
significance and a sense of ultimate efficacy.20 The theorists of fascism and
Nazism identify four overarching themes in the parties’ doctrines: (1) ethnic
nationalism; (2) anti-materialism; (3) anti-parliamentarism; and (4)
conspiracy theory.21 First, stemming from the natural causes of inherent
social inequality, “the nation” is no longer defined in political terms. Instead,
it becomes a metaphysical conception of a nation tied to a biological bond
and prescribes that only those who biologically belong to a certain ethnic
community form part of it.22 Membership is restricted to jus sanguinis and
expressed both in terms of blood and culture.23
Second, anti-materialism developed opposite to the individualist
materialist culture that flourished in 18th century writings.24 Fascist and
Nazi anti-material dogma attacks liberalism for advocating the pursuit of
individual interest and fragmenting society, and critiques Marxism for its
insistence on class warfare, as it may lead to national destruction.25
Attacking both the rational choice of liberalism and the egalitarian
propositions of Marxism, Nazism and fascism created a political doctrine of
‘socialist nationalism’ in which the individual is subordinate to the people
who form the nation.26 For reasons that draw from both the ethnic nationalist
and anti-material positions, fascism and Nazism stand in direct opposition to

19. See Wolfreys, supra note 4, at 19–34 (taking a comparative view of differing extreme right
parties).
20. Fennema, supra note 16, at 4. “By rejecting the authority of the individual and replacing it by
the numbers of some momentary mob, the parliamentary principle of majority rule sins against the basic
aristocratic principle of Nature, though it must be said that this view is not necessarily embodied in the
present-day decadence of our upper ten thousand.” ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF, vol. 1, ch. 3 (trans.)
(1943), http://www.hitler.org/writings/ Mein_Kampf/mkv1ch03.html.
21. Fennema, supra note 16, at 5.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Zeev Sternhell, The ‘Anti-materialist’ Revision of Marxism as an Aspect of the Rise of Fascist
Ideology, 22 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 379, 392 (1987).
25. B. MUSSOLINI, LA DOCTRINE DU FASCISME 67 (1952).
26. See KITSCHELT, supra note 15, at 29 (“Fascism opposed the dominance of markets and
bureaucracy and instead advocated an authoritarian, hierarchical, and communitarian order under
leadership of charismatic individuals.”); Fennema, supra note 16, at 5 (describing ethnic, or cultural,
nationalism in fascist ideology).
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liberal democracy. They attack what they consider to be the “elitist” nature
of the representational system and view majority rule as a futile attempt to
shield the individual from political responsibility. Partisan political classes
in democracies represent egotistic and self-interested entities prone to
corruption. Instead, these parties and their adherents advocate for a ‘true
democracy,’ the kind that is launched in the direct name of the people by the
people.27
Finally, under a heavy populist discourse, these ideologies claim that
there is an international conspiracy against the nation from both internal and
external enemies that interchangeably take the face of all that is foreign and
alien to the nation.28 According to these ideologies, these enemies attack the
well-being, health, and survival of the nation, therefore endangering its
“biological” future.29 Issues such as low birth rates, abortion, contraception,
economic dearth, as well as less conventional forms of interpersonal
relationships such as homosexuality, singleness, and feminism, suddenly
become threatening because they cap the ability of the nation to grow in
numbers.30 The external threat comes from immigration. These ideologies
are premised on a high degree of national homogeneity and base their
political claims on emphasizing the nation’s differences and superiority to
other nations.31 They usually derive from a shared biological or cultural
heritage and historic past, something that immigrants do not have in common
with the nation therefore threatening national cohesion. Immigrants are seen
as outsiders, a population within society that is foreign to the nation, and
which, just like a ‘foreign body,’ penetrates the homogenous social body
threatening its health and balance.32 And because, for these ideologies and
27. See Jérôme Jamin, Two Different Realities: Notes on Populism and the Extreme Right, in
VARIETIES OF RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN EUROPE 38, 40–46 (Andrea Mammone, Emanuel Godin et al.
ed., Routledge, 2012) (defining populism and nationalism on the extreme right).
28. See Fennema, supra note 16, at 7–8 (describing the prevalence of conspiracy theories in fascist
ideologies).
29. BEYERCHEN, A. D. SCIENTISTS UNDER HITLER (Ya1e Univ. Press, 1977); Falger, V. S. E.,
Sociobiology and political ideology: Comments on the radical point of view, J. HUM. EVOL. 129, 129–35
(1984); GASMAN, D. THE SCIENTIFIC ORIGINS OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM. (1971); ZMARZLIK, H.G.SOCIAL DARWINISM IN GERMANY SEEN AS A HISTORICAL PROBLEM (1972); George J. Stein, Biological
Science and the Roots of Nazism: The Promotion of Racist Doctrines in the Name of Science, 76 AM. SCI.
50, 50–8 (1988).
30. Jamin, supra note 27, at 46.
31. E.G.T. Green, O. Sarrasin, N. Fasel & C. Staerklé, Nationalism and Patriotism as Predictors of
Immigration Attitudes in Switzerland: A Municipality-level Analysis 17(4) SWISS POL. SCI. REV. 369, 370
(2011).
32. See Jens Rydgren & Joop van Holsteyn, Holland and Pim Fortuyn: A Deviant Case or the
Beginning of Something New?, in MOVEMENTS OF EXCLUSION: RADICAL RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN THE
WESTERN WORLD 41, 46 (Jens Rydgren ed., 2005) (describing the effect of concerns about asylum
seekers and other perceived outsiders on politics in the Netherlands); T. Blank, P. Schmidt, National
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their adherents, the democratic political system is technically incompetent
and morally corrupt, it is unable to protect the nation from those enemies.
By claiming that they will solve the problems that the present indirect
democracy is unable to solve by introducing a more direct and hands-on kind
of democracy, these extreme right wing parties are able to infiltrate the social
web.33
While ideology and doctrine were an important part of the development
of fascist and Nazi movements, these movements also derived a large part of
their appeal from emotion that grew out of their symbols, rituals, rallies,
culture of violence and voluntarism.34 However, movements are not static
phenomena, but instead develop and morph over time and in reaction to the
particular constituencies they pledge to serve.35 From the mid 20th century
through the past decades, these movements have undertaken a significant
constructivist turn in their public discourse and stance towards democracy.
Current political parties that embrace openly or implicitly the ideological
positions and axioms of fascism and Nazism largely refrain from
systematically attacking parliamentary democracy and focus their ferocious
critique on the individually elected representatives instead.36 Rather than
rejecting democracy wholesale, these parties push the claim that they are
more democratic than the present political establishment and therefore will
not hinder democracy but will enhance it. The next section explores exactly
how these new political parties identify and position themselves in relation
to the existing democratic establishment.
B. The Rise of New Extreme Right-Wing Parties and Political
Delegitimization
Mainstream political parties tend to quickly dismiss the emerging
extreme right as ‘fascist,’ indirectly suggesting that they lack legitimacy by
Identity in a United Germany: Nationalism or Patriotism? An Empirical Test with Representative Data,
POL. PSYCHOL. (2003) (for an empirical connection between nationalism and immigration); M.
COENDERS & P. SCHEEPERS, ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN NATIONALIST ATTITUDES AND EXCLUSIONIST
REACTIONS IN 22 COUNTRIES (2004).
33. See Rydgren & van Holsteyn, supra note 20, at 46 (describing the political rise of the far right
in the Netherlands).
34. WOLFREYS, supra note 4, at 21; DONATELLA DELLA PORTA, CLANDESTINE POLITICAL
VIOLENCE (2013); Jeff Goodwin, Review Essays: What Must We Explain to Explain Terrorism? 3 SOC.
MOVEMENT STUD. 259, 259–65 (2004).
35. See generally LUCIANO CHELES, NEO-FASCISM IN EUROPE (1991); WALTER LAQUEUR,
FASCISM: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE (1996); MARTIN A. LEE, THE BEAST REAWAKENS: FASCISM’S
RESURGENCE FROM HITLER’S SPYMASTERS TO TODAY’S NEO-NAZI GROUPS AND RIGHT-WING
EXTREMISTS (1999). For a dissenting position, see DIETHELM PROWE, FASCISM, NEW-FASCISM, NEW
RADICAL RIGHT 305–24 (R. Griffin ed., 1998).
36. Fennema, supra note 16, at 8.

BANTEKA(DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

THE RISE OF THE EXTREME RIGHT AND THE CRIME OF TERRORISM

2/5/2019 1:31 PM

135

default. There is a strong temptation to equate this new wave of extreme
right with the old version of the fascist and Nazi parties from the 1930s and
40s.37 However, I argue that, although that view is intuitively appealing,
under closer examination, the new extreme right parties are distinct from the
old ones. This is, in part, due to the circumstances within which they have
evolved and around which they constructed their political discourse in order
to gain popularity and legitimacy.
Recent advances in our interpretation of those extreme right-wing
movements suggest that they wish to be understood as a radical form of
nationalism, which is aimed at mobilizing national resources towards
rehabilitating the vulnerable and at times decayed state.38 The traditional
fascist and Nazi regimes of the 1922–1945 period were movements that
derived their identity from essentially being “anti-movements”: antiliberalist, anti-democratic, anti-communist, anti-capitalist, anti-bourgeois.39
Although the new extreme right continues to be anti-bourgeois, the rise of
the middle class in Europe and increased global interconnectedness have
shifted its polemic antipathy from the bourgeoisie, now a social minority, to
those that constitute “alien” parts of the society: immigrants and refugees,
especially those coming from different ethnic and racial backgrounds. When
juxtaposed with traditional fascist and Nazi parties, the most prominent
characteristic of the new extreme right parties is their espousal of
ethnopluralist notions of cultural protectionism, which is founded on ideas
of national purity and incompatibility of intercultural mixing.40 Though
among the contemporary extreme right parties one may still be able to
identify splinter groups that are vocally hostile to liberal and parliamentary
democracy, the majority is not openly anti-democratic. On the contrary, they
actively embrace in their popular rhetoric the democratic liberal system and
engage with it both in terms of participation, as well as by seizing the
resources it provides, and by attempting to play by the rules of the preestablished game.41 Nonetheless, these parties strongly express, at least
implicitly, anti-systemic ideas and attitudes and can be described as anti-

37. Betz, supra note 2, at 76.
38. See Interview with C. Bouchet, Far-Right Journalist, Open Revolt! (Aug. 14, 2011) (discussing
the beliefs and aims of revolutionary nationalism).
39. Michael Minkenberg, The Renewal of the Radical Right: Between Modernity and AntiModernity, 35 GOV’T AND OPPOSITION 170, 180 (2000).
40. See Sprinzak, supra note 10, at 23–25 (summarizing the evolution of the extreme right since the
early twentieth century).
41. See Jamin, supra note 27, at 46–47 (describing the common analysis of the extreme right as
being “anti-X, anti-Y, etc.”).
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egalitarian and anti-pluralist, and therefore are fundamentally opposed to the
founding principles of the democratic political system.42
Extremist political organizations and parties usually develop in social
conditions that fuel the delegitimization of the political status quo.43 While
the specifics of this process may vary between countries and across time, it
typically involves three consecutive stages: (1) a crisis of confidence; (2) a
conflict of legitimacy; (3) and a crisis of legitimacy.44 Each of these stages
refers to the relationship cultivated between a certain political organization
and its followers, both individually as well as collectively vis-a-vis the
established political regime. The delegitimization process affects the identity
of the group, which is usually made of ideological, behavioral, and
psychological components.45
Political delegitimization begins with a crisis of confidence, which is
the earliest and most moderate stage of group radicalization. In this stage, a
certain group begins to lose confidence in the governmental structure,
leading to a conflict with specific rules and policies adopted or implemented
by the government. The crisis of confidence occurs when the ideological
discrepancies between the structure and the agent, in this case the political
status quo and the group, rise to such a level that the group no longer feels
comfortable abiding by the rules of the system.46 This gives rise to a critique
of the establishment in ideological pronouncements, symbolic resistance,
and provocative – often even illegal – language and action.47 The process of
radicalization continues with a conflict of legitimacy, which involves the
emergence of a different ideological system designed to prevail over the
present structure as an alternative. This is done in the name of improving
the political system and benefiting society, while manifesting itself through
intense political action ranging from fierce demonstrations and protests to
42. Ehud Sprinzak, The Psychopolitical Formation of Extreme Left Terrorism in a Democracy: The
Case of the Weathermen, in ORIGINS OF TERRORISM 79 (Walter Reich ed., Cambridge University Press,
1990).
43. See id. at 78 (arguing that terrorism is “the behavioral product of a prolonged process of
delegitimization of the established society or the regime”).
44. Ehud Sprinzak, The Process of Delegitimization: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political
Terrorism, 3 TERRORISM AND POL. VIOLENCE 50, 54–55 (1991).
45. See id. at 56 (“The evolution of the conflict of legitimacy is not marked by ideological, symbolic
and psychological changes only. It is equally manifested by intense political action that ranges between
angry protest (demonstrations, confrontations, and vandalism) and the application of small scale
intentional violence against the regime.”).
46. See Fouad Bou Zeineddine & Felicia Pratto, Political distrust: the seed and fruit of popular
empowerment, in POWER, POLITICS, AND PARANOIA: WHY PEOPLE ARE SUSPICIOUS OF THEIR LEADERS
106, 113 (Jan-Willem van Prooijen & Paul A.M. van Lange eds., 2014) (discussing the delegitimization
of hierarchical structures).
47. See Sprinzak, supra note 42, at 66 (citing the pronouncements of the small radical group ‘the
Weathermen’).
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low-scale scattered violence.48 Finally, in the last stage of the
delegitimization process, the previous two stages culminate with the conflict
morphing into a crisis of legitimacy. Here, the entire social order, including
the individual agents comprising it, is depersonalized and dehumanized by
the group. It is considered corrupt, immoral, and incapable of representing
and efficiently governing, therefore becoming the enemy of the adherents of
that certain group.49 Both the government as well as those that it appears to
be protecting, shielding, or simply not appropriately handling, are derogated
to a lower level of personhood, which makes them susceptible to becoming
targets of extreme violence. The group then focuses its efforts towards
ridding society of what it considers to be a rotten regime and all the ills the
regime has failed to fix through systematic, unconventional attacks against
them.50
This delegitimization process reflects the way extreme right-wing
organizations and parties emerge and develop. In political systems that have
reached the second or the third stage of the delegitimization process wherein
these groups have increased popularity, they usually resort to sui generis
forms of vigilante terrorism against both the political status quo and most
importantly the individuals and groups that they consider a threat to society.
These vigilantes begin to fight private wars against these individuals and
groups, incorporating a form of particularistic terrorism that does not
undermine the regime as a universal structure but instead attacks those
individual components of it that form part of the radical group’s polemic
agenda.51 They therefore fight private wars against immigrants, racial,
ethnic, and religious minorities, homosexuals, communists, corrupt
politicians, and all classes of people they consider ‘inferior’ to the nation that
they are trying to protect from the perceived threats these groups pose.
Vigilante terrorism thrives when people believe that the government is
inadequately performing its functions, especially its obligation to protect its
constituency from this group’s perceived threats, and to make and enforce
the laws necessary to establish order.52 Usually, in the name of self-defense,
vigilantes see themselves as enforcers of the law and executioners of justice,
something that often carries high social appeal in situations and areas that
are in fact facing problems due to governmental negligence or

48. See id. at 66–67 (describing the protests of the Weathermen in Chicago).
49. Id. at 82.
50. Id.
51. See e.g. Sprinzak, supra note 44, at 64 (noting that the violence of the Nazi SA and SS and of
the KKK was not directed against the regime but against specific individuals).
52. Sprinzak, supra note 10, at 29–31.
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incompetence.53 Though vigilantism is “by no means [always] synonymous
with terrorism,” and vigilantes do not always resort to terrorist activities in
order to pursue their goals,54 certain vigilante groups, whether as a matter of
consistent policy or action, do resort to acts that could plausibly amount to
terrorist activity. Thus, a thin line demarcates certain types of vigilante acts
from terrorism, and we must examine whether a given activity crosses the
line on a case-by-case basis. However, when authorities fail to respond to
such vigilante attacks as terrorism, this failure may dangerously fray the
fabric of society and further delegitimize the status quo.55
C. The Definition and Scope of Terrorism and Terrorist Activity
According to social constructivism, social conditions shape agents and
social structures.56 Conversely, agents and social structures also shape social
conditions.57 Terror is a subjective condition of fear for one’s personal wellbeing irrespective of the source of the fear. Insofar as terror takes place in
institutional settings it is bound to be a social phenomenon.58 Terrorism is a
derivative of the social condition of terror when a specifiable agent inflicts
it to an individual or a group. But the co-constitution of agents and structures
implies that terrorism is bound to be what we say it is through our social
action and interaction with terrorist activities. It equally implies that
identifiable agents also contribute to the making of what terror and terrorism
are as they form parts of social structures. Finally, it denotes that identifiable
social structures are the ones that confer the power to agents in order to
engage in or disengage from acts of terrorism.59 The complexity of terrorism
as a derivative of social structures coupled with its often-politicized nature
has made it particularly difficult to reach a consistent definition both in the

53. See H. Jon Rosenbaum & Peter C. Sederberg, Vigilantism: An Analysis of Establishment
Violence, 6 COMP. POL. 541, 550 (1974) (noting instances where vigilantes targeted drug traffickers due
to distrust in the government’s ability to act).
54. Sprinzak, supra note 10, at 29.
55. See Benjamin Ward, Divided We Fall: Intolerance in Europe Puts Rights at Risk, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/14/divided-we-fall-intoleranceeurope-puts-rights-risk (discussing the widespread violence against perceived outsiders by extremist
groups in Europe).
56. See generally Bourdieu, Pierre and Richard Nice. 1977. Outline of a theory of practice. Vol. 16;
PIERRE BOURDIEU ET AL., THE CRAFT OF SOCIOLOGY. EPISTEMOLOGICAL PRELIMINARIES. (Beate Krais
ed., 1991); JOSÉ LÓPEZ & JOHN SCOTT, SOCIAL STRUCTURE (2000); Porpora, Douglas. “Social Structure:
e future of a Concept”. In Sing Chew & David Knottneurs (Ed.), Structure, culture and history: recent
issues in social theory. Boston: Rowman & Little eld, (2002): 43-62; JACQUES RANCIÈRE,
DISAGREEMENT. POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY (1999).
57. Nicholas Onuf, Making Terror/ism, 23 INT’L REL. 53, 54 (2009).
58. Id. at 53.
59. Id. at 54.
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domestic as well as the international contexts.60 This section will give an
overview of the legislative actions in the EU in relation to the criminalization
of terrorism and terrorist activities. It will then analyze the legal
requirements for the qualification of an offence as terrorist under the existing
legal frameworks.
Progressively, we understand terrorism as ranging from threatening or
infringing upon the individual right to life and personal inviolability to the
destruction of public and private property, rendering efforts to establish a
definition and a comprehensive framework for its criminalization rather
difficult. The first efforts to systematically suppress “terrorism” in Europe
go back to the Council of Europe, under the European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism of 1977. One of the purposes of this Convention
was to separate political offences from violent acts that were triggered by
political motive, which it addressed through the listing of a series of acts
labeled as terrorist offences.61 Inasmuch as the European Convention
addressed a series of terrorist acts, it shied away from offering a definitive
definition of terrorism as a crime. The 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S.
promulgated the revision of the Convention extending several of these acts
and their scope.62 The later Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of
2005 by the Council of Europe included a more elaborate listing and
description of acts that constitute terrorist activity but also failed to offer a
conclusive definition of terrorism.63 In a similar vein, the European Council
and the European Commission issued a proposal followed by a Council
Framework Decision on combating terrorism with the specific purpose of
harmonizing Member States’ domestic legislation with regard to terrorist

60. Ben Saul, Defining ‘Terrorism’ to Protect Human Rights 18 (Fundación para las Relaciones
Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, Working Paper No. 20, 2006). Ben Saul, in his Working Paper for
FRIDE, after studying several (mostly policy) definitions and taking into account the quality standards
set for legal definitions, proposed the following definition: “1. Any serious, violent, criminal act intended
to cause death or serious bodily injury, or to endanger life including by acts against property; 2. where
committed outside an armed conflict; 3. for a political, ideological, religious or ethnic purpose; and 4.
where intended to: a. create extreme fear in a person, group or the general public; and b. seriously
intimidate a population or part of a population; or c. unduly compel a government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. 5. Advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action
which is not intended to cause death, serious bodily harm or serious risk to public health or safety does
not constitute a terrorist act.”
61. Council of Europe, European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, ETS
No. 90, art 1 in Table 1 of Appendix I [hereinafter Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism].
62. See Council of Europe, European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977,
ETS No. 90, as amended by the 2003 Protocol (“Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001,
the Council of Europe undertook a revision of this Convention, in order to enhance its effectiveness.”).
63. Council of Europe, Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, May 16, 2005, CETS No. 196.
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offenses in accordance with the Treaty of the European Union (TEU).64 This
Framework Decision was finally replaced by a European Parliament and
Council Directive issued in 2017 on combatting terrorism with an
implementation deadline for Member States on September 8, 2018.65
Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
Directives are a form of EU legislation used as a tool of harmonization of
Member States’ substantive law.66 Directives allow Member States certain
discretion in terms of the means they will choose to implement directives
into domestic law. The Directive on combating terrorism is aimed at
providing a uniform legal framework across EU Member States for the
prosecution of individuals responsible for terrorist activity.67 It is, therefore,
the central legal instrument of the EU’s battle against both domestic and
international terrorism on the basis of a common definition of terrorist
offenses and establishing means for Member States to cooperate in
prosecuting them.
Attempting to institute a common definition for terrorist activity within
the EU, the Directive distinguishes two distinct types of offenses: terrorist
offenses,68 and offenses relating to a terrorist group.69 Article 3 of the
Directive provides an extensive list of terrorist offenses for the
criminalization under national law due to their potential to seriously damage
a country or an international organization (IO).70 The Directive also includes
an element of intent for terrorist activities requiring that the perpetrator aim
at “i) seriously intimidating a population, ii) unduly compelling a
Government or IO to perform or abstain from performing an act, or iii)
seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political,
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international
organization.”71
The most contested element of Article 3 is what has become known as
the requirement of endangerment. The question of whether the provision in

64. Tamar Meisels, Defining terrorism – a typology, 12 CRITICAL REV. OF INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL.
331, 331–51 (2009).
65. Directive 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on
Combating Terrorism and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and Amending
Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, 2017 O.J. (L 88) 6.
66. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288, May 9
2008, 2008 O.J. (C115) 47.
67. Directive 2017/541, Preamble, supra note 65.
68. Id. art 3.
69. Id. art 4.
70. Id. art. 3.
71. Elisabeth Symeonidou-Kastanidou, Defining Terrorism, 12 EUR. J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 14,
24 (2004).
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Article 3, “which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a
country or an international organization,” should be regarded as an objective
requirement for qualifying an act as a terrorist offense has been heavily
debated since the inclusion of the same wording in the earlier Framework
Decision.72 Interpreting endangerment as an objective requirement would
essentially suggest that, in order for a certain activity to be qualified as
terrorism, one must assess the given circumstances in which it took place
and the extent and seriousness of damage caused or threatened to a country
or IO. This requirement of endangerment is essentially what distinguishes
terrorist and non-terrorist criminal behavior. However, whether the
Framework Decision and Directive drafters intended for this element to be
an objective element is unclear. The English text gives little guidance as to
the nature of the second element.73 In the German and Dutch versions of the
text, the phrase could be understood as a dependent subordinate clause to the
first requirement and not as a separate requirement.74 Under this
interpretation, all acts listed in Article 3 are intrinsically so grave that they
may seriously damage a country or IO provided that all other elements are
met.75 In this light, this element would not be considered an objective one
in qualifying punishable behavior as terroristic. Thus, examination of the
text in its different languages provides conflicting interpretations with none
being authoritative.
These different and conflicting approaches yield two possible ways of
qualifying a criminal act as terrorism. First, if the endangerment element of
Article 3 of the Directive is understood as an objective element, this would
essentially mean that a punishable offense could be committed with terrorist
intent but would not qualify as a terrorist offense if the degree of
endangerment threatened or caused did not cross the threshold of seriously
damaging a country or ΙΟ. However, this first objective interpretation begs
the question of whether the endangerment requirement was intended to be so
strictly construed that it would be applicable only to the most heinous and
dangerous acts. There is nothing to suggest that such a limited scope should

72. Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2012 on Combating Terrorism 2002
O.J. (L 164) 3, 4; European Union: Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision
2002/475 on Combating Terrorism (June 13, 2002), 2002/475/JHA. See, e.g., Symeonidou-Kastanidou,
supra note 71, at 26; Sussanne Voigt, Der EU-Rahmenbeschluss zur Terrorismusbekämpfung – ein
wirksames Mittel der Terrorabwehr, in DIE EUROPÄISCHE UNION IM KAMPF GEGEN DEN TERRORISMUS:
SICHERHEIT VS. FREIHEIT? 201, 225 (Erwin Müller & Patricia Schneider eds., 2006).
73. Directive 2017/541, art. 3, supra note 65.
74. Id.
75. See Thomas Weigend, The Universal Terrorist: The International Community Grappling with
a Definition, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 912, 928–32 (2006) (discussing the problem of defining terrorism
and interpreting the laws that address it).
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be attributed to the Directive, or the earlier Framework Decision, especially
given that what constitutes “serious damage” is in itself unclear.76 Realizing
the drafting ambiguity, Weigend attempted to provide a different
explanation, arguing that a sensible interpretation of this clause might take
as the point of reference any ‘damage’ on the ability of the state to credibly
fulfill its main functions of providing basic means of survival and
infrastructure as well as fundamental public security to its citizens.77 These
functions can be damaged “through large-scale interference with the
provision of water, energy, and traffic routes, but also through random
attacks on individuals, which endangers the state’s ability to provide
protection for life and limb.”78
Conversely, opting for a flexible interpretation of the endangerment
requirement while giving courts the liberty to decide against a certain
background whether an offense is likely to seriously damage a country or an
IO could create a more viable framework for assessing the nature of said
offense.79 The existence or absence of terrorist intent can be incorporated as
the criterion determining the terrorist nature of an offense. In this light, the
endangerment criterion still remains relevant to the extent that it is
incorporated in the categories of behavior listed in Article 3, which
themselves are understood to cause serious damage to a country or an IO.
Under this reading, it is the perpetrator’s intent that becomes the decisive
point of determining the qualification of the offense as terroristic.
Despite the obvious difference between these two approaches, there is
also a certain degree of cohesion between them. In interpreting the
requirement of endangerment, it is imperative that terrorist intent be taken
into consideration. Similarly, the existence of terrorist intent may be inferred
from the objective nature of the offense itself, making it the decisive factor.
While the one approach is objective and the other subjective, they both
indicate that a strictly narrow interpretation of the endangerment requirement
as an objective element runs counter to the aims of the Directive as a whole
and the construction of Article 3.

76. Matthias J. Borgers, Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism: Two Questions on the
Definition of Terrorist Offences, 1 NEW J. EUR. CRIM. L. 68, 72 (2012).
77. Weigend, supra note 75, at 930 n.79.
78. Id.
79. Borgers, supra note 76, at 73.
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PART II
A. Political Parties & Terrorism
Historically, terrorism linked to political parties was exemplified by the
fascist and Nazi politics of the interwar era. For these parties in Europe, a
sine qua non condition of existence was the “incorporation of paramilitary
units specializing in the use of violence against” perceived threats to the
party.80 Though such paramilitary groups were definitely violent, it is
questionable whether their violence would amount to terrorist activity under
today’s vague and restrictive legal standards. However, such groups
commonly carried out semi-clandestine “punitive expeditions” against
symbolic political targets in order to intimidate and terrorize not only the
immediate victim but also a much wider audience, which this target
represented. Some went on to describe and analyze these operations as
terrorist.81
Generally, political parties and terrorist groups stand on the extreme,
opposite ends of the spectrum. Political theorists conceive political parties
to be integral to democracy, playing an indispensable role in the democratic
political process.82 Democracy operates through political parties because
they grant citizens the opportunity to influence and participate in political
life. Political parties also facilitate checks and balances within the
government because they can be held accountable by the public for the way
they perform their political acts and duties.83 On the other hand, terrorist
organizations are defined on the basis of unjustified, often unaccountable and
illegal violence directed against the government or individual members of
the public. Instead of engaging in the logic of persuasion, usually conveyed
by political parties, they operate under the logic of coercion, which they
employ to meet their ideological or pragmatic goals. If political parties are
80. LEONARD WEINBERG & AMI PEDAHZUR, POLITICAL PARTIES AND TERRORIST GROUPS 12
(Roger Eatwell & Cas Mudde eds., 2003).
81. Id.
82. See Richard Gunther & Larry Diamond, Types and Functions of Parties, in POLITICAL PARTIES
AND DEMOCRACY 3, 7–9 (Larry Diamond & Richard Gunther eds., 2001) (describing the functions of
political parties); S. C. Stokes, Political Parties and Democracy, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 243, 263–64
(1999) (discussing political parties as an “unavoidable” aspect of democracy). See generally RUSSEL J.
DALTON ET AL., POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIC LINKAGE: HOW PARTIES ORGANIZE
DEMOCRACY (Hans-Dieter Klingemann & Ian McAllister eds., 2011).
83. See ALAN WARE, CITIZENS, PARTIES AND THE STATE: A REAPPRAISAL 184–214 (1988)
(discussing the power wielded by political parties); Wolfgang C. Müller, Political Parties in
Parliamentary Democracies: Making Delegation and Accountability Work, 37 EUR. J. POL. RES. 309,
329–31 (2000) (noting the institutional checks within political parties); Kaare Strøm, Delegation and
Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, 37 EUR. J. POL. RES. 261, 272–82 (2000) (discussing the
oversight mechanisms in parliamentary democracies).
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the ones constituting democracy, then terrorist groups are the ones
attempting to tear it apart.84
Nonetheless, this distinction becomes blurry when these two forms of
political organization operate under questionable and problematic — for
democracy’s sake — circumstances, where the legitimacy of both the entire
political structure, as well as of the sub-parties comprising it, is questioned
both by the circumstances and by the people. Under such circumstances, the
roles may reverse.85 In times when organizations that were marginalized in
the past for their recurring use of violence and terrorizing activity take on
mainstream roles and even rise to the form of political parties, they call into
question the legitimacy of the political structure itself. Commonly, political
parties become involved in terrorist activity when a faction emerges on the
extremist end and begins perpetrating violence. Conversely, the party itself
may be the product of mainstream support it has received in the past as an
organization whose principal mode of expression was in a specified
spectrum of violence.86 The group’s methods receive the support of the
public vote, which deceivingly gives it the impression of legitimization. This
further blurs distinctions between political parties and terrorist activities
when they “take advantage of conflicts and promote terrorism in order to”
gain popularity and votes.87
Due to this lack of distinguishability, terrorism ought not to be
understood as an identity but as an activity. The fluidity that ordinarily
characterizes organizational structures, such as groups of people that rely on
violence as a means of political expression, may often generate different
identities for the given group at given times. Terrorist activity may be the
primary form of operation for a group over a period of time, and it may be
abandoned and re-employed at a later time when such need arises. In order
for a group to be considered as performing terrorist activity, this activity need
be neither constant and uniform throughout time nor the only weapon in the
group’s arsenal. It is possible for a certain group to employ terrorist activities
in conjunction with mainstream political activity at different levels of
centralization and diffusion.88

84. WEINBERG & PEDAHZUR, supra note 80, at 12–13.
85. See Thomas Perry Thornton, Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation, in INTERNAL WAR 71,
89–95 (Harry Eckstein ed., 1964) (discussing the role of terrorism within a political structure).
86. WEINBERG & PEDAHZUR, supra note 80, at 37.
87. Id. at 57.
88. See generally European Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Guidelines on Prohibition and
Dissolution of Political Parties and Analogous Measures, VENICE COMMISSION 8–16 (Jan. 10, 2000),
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-INF(2000)001-e.

BANTEKA(DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

THE RISE OF THE EXTREME RIGHT AND THE CRIME OF TERRORISM

2/5/2019 1:31 PM

145

In terms of accountability, the Council of Europe Venice Commission
for Democracy through the Law has stated that “[a] political party as a whole
cannot be held responsible for the individual behavior of members not
authorized by the party,” though it accepts the possibility of constitutional
bans on openly violent groups.89 Article 17 of the Directive on combatting
terrorism spells out the liability incurred by legal persons for terrorist activity
as should be implemented by Member States.90 Under Article 17 of the
Directive, legal persons shall be held liable for any of the offenses that fall
under the substantive provisions of Articles 3 to 12 and 14 of the Directive
committed “for their benefit by any person, acting either individually or as
part of an organ of the legal person, and having a leading position within the
legal person” based on power of representation, decision-making authority,
or authority to exercise control with regards to the legal person.91 As a
corollary, legal persons shall be held liable when the lack of the above
supervision or control “has made possible the commission of any of the
offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 and 14 [of the Directive] for the
benefit of that legal person by a person under its authority.”92 While the first
paragraph creates a particularly high threshold for attribution, the second
paragraph leaves a much larger margin of appreciation relating to both what
constitutes a “lack of supervision or control” and its measurability.93
Through Article 17, the Directive allows potential liability and prosecution
not only of individuals but also of entities with legal personality, which could
at times include political parties depending on the constitutional provisions
of the state in which they operate.
One of the activities often perpetrated by such extreme right-wing
entities and often correlated to terrorism is hate crimes.94 Empirical research
often labels hate crimes as a “close cousin” to terrorism based on a target
selection that takes place according to a victim’s group identity instead of
individual behavior, but also based on a desired effect to wreak terror on a
wider number of individuals beyond those specifically targeted.95 This
assertion is strengthened through similar empirical findings demonstrating a
causal relationship between economic conditions, hate crimes, and
89. See Roger Eatwell, Introduction: The New Extreme Right Challenge, in WESTERN
DEMOCRACIES AND THE NEW EXTREME RIGHT CHALLENGE 1, 4 (Roger Eatwell & Cas Mudde eds.,
2004) (citing the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission for Democracy through the Law (1999)).
90. Council Directive 2017/541, art. 17, 2017 O.J. (L 88) 6, 16.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malečková, Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism:
Is There a Causal Connection? 10–13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9074, 2002).
95. E.g., id. at 4.

BANTEKA (DO NOT DELETE)

146

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

2/5/2019 1:31 PM

[Vol 29:127

terrorism.96 Both empirical research and theory have attempted to address
whether the two crimes that are legally distinct but conceptually overlapping
have only similarities or whether there is a stricter bond of correlation or
causation between them. In some empirical studies, perpetrators of hate
crimes are seen as having questionable plan-setting, blurry culpability, or as
lacking the ideological and political affiliation inherent to terrorist activity,
distinguishing their crimes from the planned nature of terrorist activity and
its association with ideological or political groups.97 Other studies consider
terrorism as an “upward crime” involving perpetrators that belong either to
a lower socioeconomic status than the victim or to a minority group that is
acting against the majority.98 By contrast, hate crime perpetrators are often
members of the majority group in society, rendering it a downward crime.99
These types of distinctions help taxonomize but do not address the question
of the correct classification of crimes perpetrated in ways that do not
necessarily fall within mainstream understandings of either hate crimes or
terrorism.
Despite the legal and conceptual distinction between terrorism and hate
crimes, there is an ever-evolving position in both empirical research and
scholarship arguing that a closer connection between the two exists. Hate
crime scholars often assert that the two offenses entail an intrinsic “desire to
terrorize a broader social group,”100 an argument espoused by the U.S.
Supreme Court when discussing the constitutionality of hate crime laws in
Wisconsin v. Mitchell.101 Ethnographic research on neo-Nazi groups has
explicitly linked hate crimes and terrorism by implementing a theory of
domestic terrorism in explaining active involvement in extremist right-wing

96. See Christopher J. Lyons, Community (Dis)Organization and Racially Motivated Crime, 113
AM. J. SOC. 815, 846–51 (2007) (examining the relationship between community structures and racial
violence). But see Donald Green et al., Defended Neighborhoods, Integration, and Racially Motivated
Crime, 104 AM. J. SOC. 372, 394–98 (1998) (determining that there is no link between economic
conditions and racial violence); Krueger & Malečková, supra note 94, at 10–13 (finding no empirical link
between economic deprivation and racial strife).
97. Helmut Willems et al., Fremdenfeindliche Gerwalt: Eine Analyse von Täterstrukturen und
Eskalationsprozessen. Forschungsbericht im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Frauen (1993); Gary
LaFree & Laura Dugan, How Does Studying Terrorism Compare to Studying Crime?, in TERRORISM AND
COUNTER- TERRORISM: CRIMINOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 53, 57–61 (Mathieu DeFlem ed., 2004).
98. Donald Black, The Geometry of Terrorism, 22 SOC. THEORY 14, 18–20 (2004); Roberta
Senechal de la Roche, Collective Violence as Social Control, 11 SOC. F. 97, 100–15 (1996).
99. Kathleen Deloughery, Ryan D. King & Victoral Asal, Close Cousins or Distant Relatives? The
Relationship Between Terrorism and Hate Crime, 58 CRIME & DELINQ. 663, 665 (2012).
100. Donald P. Green, Laurence H. McFalls & Jennifer K. Smith, Hate Crime: An Emergent
Research Agenda, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 479, 483 (2001).
101. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
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organizations.102 Certain scholars go even further, asserting that hate crimes
and terrorism are simply two sides of the same coin and constitute different
manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon.103 Combining the bias
motivation of hate crime attacks with the intent of sending a message not
only to the targeted individuals but also to the group that individual
represents often allows hate crimes to function as a particular form of
terrorism.104 This overlapping nature of hate crimes and terrorism becomes
all the more evident through an examination of the crime of terrorism in the
European context through the lens of one such political party: Greece’s
Golden Dawn.
B. Golden Dawn’s Background
After the end of the Second World War, the legacy of authoritarianism
limited the electoral demand for extreme right political groups and parties in
Europe.105 When and where such groups emerged, they were quickly
dismissed by mainstream politics and were either absorbed by right-wing
parties or marginalized to the fringes of the political system. Despite the
sporadic successes of extreme right-wing political parties in the past decades,
not much attention was paid to a potential wave of extreme right resurgence
taking place in Europe until after the fact. But the recent increased popularity
of extreme right parties has escalated with the growing pattern of mounting
electoral success they have received. The mainstream wave of these parties
began with Jean-Marie Le Pen’s French National Front run-off ballot success
in 2003 and the British National Party seeing unprecedented success in
electing several councilors since 2001.106 Golden Dawn’s successes in the
latest consecutive Greek parliamentary elections and Hungary’s Jobbik
European and Hungarian Parliamentary electoral results followed.107 Most

102. MARK S. HAMM, AMERICAN SKINHEADS: THE CRIMINOLOGY AND CONTROL OF HATE CRIME
209–18 (Steven A. Egger ed., 1993).
103. Deloughery, King & Asal, supra note 99, at 675–83.
104. Gregory M. Herek, Jeanine C. Cogan & J. Roy Gillis, Victim Experiences in Hate Crimes Based
on Sexual Orientation, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 319, 336 (2002).
105. See ANTONIS A. ELLINAS, THE MEDIA AND THE FAR RIGHT IN WESTERN EUROPE 12–19 (2010)
(discussing the minor political role of the far right in 1950s Europe); PIERO IGNAZI, EXTREME RIGHT
PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE 196 (2003) (noting the failure of extreme right parties to gain a foothold
in recently democratized countries); KITSCHELT, supra note 15, at 32–35 (discussing factors and
coalitions supporting far right parties).
106. For a popular account along these lines see CLAIRE STERLING, THE TERROR NETWORK 25–48
(1981). See also Cas Mudde, The 2014 Hungarian Parliamentary Elections, or How to Craft a
Constitutional Majority, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2014/04/14/the-2014-hungarian-parliamentary-elections-or-how-to-craft-a-constitutionalmajority/ (discussing the recent success of far right political candidates in Hungary).
107. Mudde, supra note 106.
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recently, Marine Le Pen had major success in the 2014 European
Parliamentary election finishing first and also advancing to the second round
of the most recent French Presidential elections.108 The Party for Freedom
in The Netherlands won 20 out of 150 seats in the Parliament,109 the
Alternative for Germany became the third leading party in the Bundestag,110
the Austrian People’s Party emerged as the largest in the National Council,111
and Italy’s Lega Nord obtained its best ever results in the 2018 general
election.112 The new trend in voters’ psychology of moving away from
traditional partisan allegiances to being highly influenced by party positions
on immigration, economic struggle, and law and order, gives space to
populist claims. The recent rise in the numbers of ethnic and social
minorities in Europe, coupled with growing concerns about the future of
democracy triggered by political delegitimization, have emptied the arsenals
of mainstream political parties and have created more space for the populist
extreme right to establish itself.113
Despite these developments, the electoral success of Golden Dawn in
Greece took many by surprise. Before the 2012 Greek elections, Golden
Dawn received 0.29% of the vote in the 2009 elections, a percentage that
accounted for an almost negligible number of votes.114 It is therefore
important, in assessing both its political profile and the reasons why it
attracted such a large piece of the electoral pie so suddenly, to briefly trace
the evolution of Golden Dawn.
People’s Association Golden Dawn or, as ordinarily referred to, Golden
Dawn, was founded in 1983 by Nikos Michaloliakos, who still serves as the
leader of the party.115 According to its founding documents, the party is self-

108. Shehab Khan, Marine Le Pen Temporarily Steps down as Front National Leader to Concentrate
on Presidential Bid, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 24, 2017; John Mark & Leila Abboud, Far-Right National
Front stuns French Elite with EU ‘Earthquake,’ REUTERS, May 25, 2014; Adam Mossiter, Why Macron
Won: Luck, Skill and France’s Dark History, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2017.
109. VVD de Grootste, Zwaar vVerlies PvdA, DE TELEGRAAF, March 16, 2017.
110. CDU/CSU Remains Strongest Parliamentary Group in the Bundestag Despite Losses,
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.bundestag.de/en/documents /textarchive/election2017/527284.
111. Noah Barkin, What Austria’s Election Says About Europe’s Political Landscape, REUTERS, Oct.
15, 2017.
112. Alessandro Sala, Elezioni 2018, i Risultati: M5S Primo Partito, nel Centrodestra la Lega
Supera FI – Lo Spoglio in Tempo Reale, L’ITALIA AL VOTO, Mar. 4, 2018.
113. Eatwell, supra note 89, at 3.
114. Antonis A. Ellinas, The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece, 18
SOUTH EUR. SOC’Y & POL. 543, 548 (2013).
115. Id. at 547.
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declared to base its “faith on the ideology of nationalism.”116 The party’s
flag is black, red, and white, like that of the original Nazi Party of Germany,
with a swastika-like emblem at the center, which Golden Dawn claims is the
symbol of the Greek meander. For about a decade after its creation, the party
remained inactive. It seized upon the opportunity to reemerge in 1993 amidst
the nationalist fervor undertaking Greece over the naming dispute between
Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).117
Through the 1980s, Golden Dawn openly flirted with ideas of national
socialism and fascism.118 In the 1990s they decided to ideologically side
with popular nationalism and to avoid explicit reference to interwar
ideologies as much as possible.119 Nevertheless, Golden Dawn’s manifesto
calls for the creation of a People’s Nationalist State, which does “not ignore
the law of diversity and difference in nature” and asserts that “[b]y respecting
the spiritual, ethnic and racial inequality of humans we can build equity and
law in society.”120 Golden Dawn used to be synonymous with violent attacks
against minorities across the board that led to social marginalization of the
party. Golden Dawn received hardly any support throughout the 1990s and
until the few most recent general elections in Greece it remained a fringe
group.121
In 1998, Antonios Androutsopoulos, the party’s number two in the
leadership, was convicted and sentenced to 21 years in prison for attempted
murder against three left-wing students.122 Golden Dawn briefly suspended
its operations and remained under the radar until the 2009 European and
national elections where it received 0.46% and 0.29% of the votes
respectively. The first electoral success of Golden Dawn came in 2010 in
the municipal elections shortly after the aftershocks of the financial crisis
began in Greece. There, Golden Dawn’s leader received a surprising 5.29%
of the vote and a seat on the Athens city council.123 Two years later, in its
campaign for the 2012 general elections, Golden Dawn not only openly
116. Golden Dawn, Katastatiko Toy Politikoy Kommatos me Tēn Epōnymia “Laïkos Syndesmos
Chrysē Aygē,” [Statutes of the Political Party with the name “Popular Association - Golden Dawn”], art.
2 (2012), www.xryshaygh.com/enimerosi/view/to-alhthino-katastatiko-ths-chrushs-aughs.
117. See generally Tauόtηta, CHRYSĒ AYGĒ, www.xryshaygh.com/kinima (last visited Oct. 5, 2018)
(discussing Golden Dawn’s rise in Greece).
118. Ellinas, supra note 114, at 548.
119. DIMITRIS PSARAS, Ē MAYRĒ BIBLOS TĒS CHRYSĒS AYGĒS [Golden Dawn’s Black Bible] 250–
51 (2012).
120. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HATE ON THE STREETS: XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE IN GREECE 37
(July 2012), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/greece0712ForUpload.pdf (citing Tauόtηta,
CHRYSĒ AYGĒ , www.xryshaygh.com/kinima (last visited June 6, 2012)).
121. Ellinas, supra note 114, at 546.
122. Psaras, supra note 119, at 84–139.
123. Ellinas, supra note 114, at 548.
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issued threats of violence against parliamentary deputies who opposed its
policies, but its members were also allegedly involved in numerous violent
attacks across Greece.124 Though the party officially denies such
involvement, public incidents of violence, such as Golden Dawn’s
spokesman assaulting two female politicians on national television during a
live debate, suggest otherwise.125 Leading up to the 2012 election, Golden
Dawn campaigned on the slogan, “So we can rid this land of filth,” speaking
directly and openly about violence against immigrants. As in the case of
extreme right parties elsewhere in Europe,126 its original breakthrough
combined with its growing popularity “became the springboard for [Golden
Dawn’s twenty-fold electoral growth” in the 2012 and 2015 elections.127
But to comprehend the factors that generated this hefty realignment of
the Greek electorate, it is vital to appreciate both the nature of the modern
Greek political system as well as the effects of the recent financial crisis in
contributing to a delegitimization of the status quo. The Greek political
system has long been thought to be in crisis,128 suffering from high levels of
corruption, a clientele-based election system, and populist trends.129 While
these longstanding problems of the Greek political system had often been
identified, they were heavily tolerated and nurtured as they provided a
predictable way of ‘getting things done’ both on the part of the politicians as

124. See, e.g., (in Greek): Serious clashes with three wounded on the Zografou university campus,
TO VIMA, Mar. 29, 2012; Clash of anarchists and Golden Dawners in Livadia, PROTO THEMA, Mar. 29,
2012; Nationalists “hit” an ANTARSYA stall at Chania, PROTO THEMA, Apr. 25, 2012.
125. Helena Smith, Greek Golden Dawn MP assaults female politicians on TV talkshow, THE
GUARDIAN (June 7, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/07/greek-golden-dawn-mpassaults-females-tv.
126. See KITSCHELT, supra note 15, at 99–102 (1995) (discussing long-term growth of right wing
parties in Europe).
127. Ellinas, supra note 114, at 549.
128. See generally I. KONTIADES & C. ANTHOPOULOS, KRISEÌ TOU HELLEÌNIKOU POLITIKOU
SYSTEÌMATOS? (2008); C. SIMITRIS, DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? (2007); X. KONTIADES, DEFICIENT
DEMOCRACY: STATE AND PARTIES IN MODERN GREECE (Sideris, 2009); CHARÄS KASTANIDÄS, KRISÄ
KAI METARRYTHMISÄ TOU POLITIKOU SYSTÄMATOS (2009); TH. VEREMIS & H. TSOUKAS, THE
ANATOMY OF CRISIS (Skai Publications, Neo Faliro 2011).
129. See Christos Lyrintzis, Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A case of ‘Bureaucratic
Clientelism’?, 7 WEST EUROPEAN POL. 99, 99–116 (1984) (discussing the development of the Greek
party system following the junta government in 1974); DIMITRI A. SOTIROPOULOS, POPULISM AND
BUREAUCRACY: THE CASE OF GREECE UNDER PASOK, 1981-1989 (1996) (discussing trends in Greek
politics in the 1980s); TAKIS S. PAPPAS, MAKING PARTY DEMOCRACY IN GREECE (1999) (discussing
Greek political development); Apostolis Papakostas, Why is There no Clientelism in Scandinavia? A
Comparison of the Swedish and Greek Sequences of Development, in CLIENTELISM, INTERESTS, AND
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE IN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 31, (Simona Piattoni ed., 2001) (discussing clientelism in Greece in a comparative
perspective). See generally Mike Featherstone, An Introduction, in GLOBAL CULTURE 1, 1–12 (Mike
Featherstone ed., 1990) (describing the globalization if culure).
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well as their constituencies. All this, until the financial crisis hit and, in an
abrupt way, forced the political system to face its endemic problems.
However, financial crisis alone does not explain the rise of Golden
Dawn. Despite popular belief, right-wing extremism is not necessarily
bolstered during periods of financial recession, nor is it caused by periods of
financial recession.130 Commentators and scholars rush to cite Hitler’s 1930
Weimar Germany as a paradigmatic example of how financial crises lead to
electoral victories of the extreme right as people abandon rationality and
resort to radical populism.131 While this is one possible factor, I argue that
financial crises do not exist in isolation from other sociopolitical conditions
under which these political parties come to power. Instead, they occur in
tandem with sociopolitical issues such as unemployment, intolerance, fear of
immigration, higher crime rates, and of everything that appears alien. The
financial crisis is only the tip of the iceberg in a much deeper and
multidimensional crisis over national identity, culture, and way of life, which
leads to a conflict and, arguably, a crisis of legitimacy within the political
system.132
The Greek political system now finds itself at a crossroads. The period
beginning with the end of the military junta in 1974 and the restoration of
democracy has been defined by a relatively stable bipartisan system that
secured the country’s path towards membership in the EU, an enhancement
of civil rights and freedoms, an expansion of the welfare state, and increased
levels of development and growth.133 On the flip side, this period was also
characterized by systemic corruption, public administration failures, and a

130. But see Alex Rosenberg, Turn right at the crash: Financial crises boost right-wing candidates,
German study finds, CNBC (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/23/turn-right-at-the-crashfinancial-crises-boost-right-wing-candidates-german-study-finds.html (discussing the electoral boost
enjoyed by the extreme right in Europe following financial crises); Manuel Funke & Christoph Trebesch,
Financial Crises and the Populist Right, 15 ifo DICE report 6, (2017), https://www.cesifo-group.de/
DocDL/dice-report-2017-4-funke-trebesch-december.pdf (noting that “financial crises of the past 30
years have been a catalyst of right-wing populist politics); Simon Oxenham, What explains Brexit, Trump
and the rise of the far right?, NEWSCIENTIST (July 4, 2016), https://www.newscientist.com/article/
2095975-what-explains-brexit-trump-and-the-rise-of-the-far-right/ (“Over a period of nearly 150 years,
we have seen that every financial crisis was followed by a 10-year surge in support for far right populist
parties”).
131. See Audrey Sheehy, The Rise of the Far Right, HARV. POL. REV. (Feb. 11, 2017),
http://harvardpolitics.com/world/rise-of-far-right/ (noting that far-right figures are validated by the
actions of others with similar views, creating a domino effect); Antonis Klapsis, Economic Crisis and
Political Extremism in Europe: From the 1930s to the Present, 13 EUR. VIEW 189, 195–98 (2014)
(drawing parallels between Hitler’s rhetoric of economic recovery with modern extreme right figures).
132. P. Papasarantopoulos, To big bang ths Xrysh Avgis [Golden Dawn’s big bang], 23 THE BOOKS’
J. 12–19 (2012).
133. See ARIS TRANTIDIS, CLIENTELISM AND ECONOMIC POLICY: GREECE AND THE CRISIS 1–12
(2016) (describing increased growth and development in Greece).
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large accumulation of public debt.134 The financial crisis that fully broke out
in Greece in 2008 generated a political transition reflected in the sudden
reduction of the two main political parties’, Panhellenic Socialist Movement
(PASOK) and New Democracy, electoral shares. The two parties witnessed
their shares drop from a cumulative average of 80% to an unprecedented low
of 32% in May 2012, 42% in the repeat elections of June 2012, and 32% in
September 2015.135 This sudden and vast change in electoral results reflects
a general sentiment of delegitimization towards democratic institutions.
Institutions were no longer seen as carriers of public representation but of
corruption, and radical action was considered necessary to repair them.136
This mentality and sociopolitical framework has since dominated the
discourse within the Greek political system. This shift has allowed direct
attacks against core democratic institutions and their representatives, but also
a rupture of the social fabric with a rise of hate crimes against and
marginalization of minorities, such as immigrants, refugees, and members of
the LGBT community.137
This new climate of delegitimization of the Greek political system
combined with its failure to provide alternative routes of political
participation explains in part the increased legitimization enjoyed by the
extreme right and their use of violence as a tool for expression of political
dissatisfaction. This new political culture manifests itself through the
mainstreaming and normalization of right-wing extremism within Greek
society. Golden Dawn was best positioned to reap the benefit of this
realignment of the Greek political electorate. Being at the margins of
political culture and far outside parliamentary politics in the past, Golden
Dawn was able to turn its pariah status into an emblem of political purity and
desire for a radical transformation of past and present Greek politics.138
Golden Dawn, a self-identified nationalist party and described as a rightwing extremist, even fascist, neo-Nazi party, received 7% of the national
vote and 18 seats in the Parliament during the last election, making it the

134. Roman Gerodimos, Greece: Politics at the Crossroads, 4 POL. INSIGHT 16, 16 (Apr. 2013).
135. Id.
136. See Theofanis Exadaktylos & Nikos Zahariadis, The lack of public trust in political institutions
is a massive obstacle to public policy change in Greece, THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECON. AND POL. SCI.
(Jan. 17, 2013), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/01/17/greece-trust-institutions/ (demonstrating
growing public distrust of the government in Greece); Costas Azariadis & Yannis M. Ioannides, Thinking
About Corruption in Greece (Feb. 20, 2015) (unpublished discussion paper, Tufts University) (on file
with Tufts University Library system) (discussing public corruption in Greece).
137. Gerodimos, supra note 134, at 17–18.
138. See Ellinas, supra note 114, at 557–58 (discussing how Golden Dawn took advantage of
growing xenophobia in Greece to capture the electorate).
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third largest party represented in the Greek Parliament.139 Golden Dawn won
votes not only in the large urban centers where its supporters “stage pogroms
against immigrants and do battle with leftist youths and anarchists” but
across the country and varying demographics.140 This normalization and
institutionalization of what until a few years ago was an organization that
epitomized anti-democratic rhetoric and openly promoted violence as a form
of political expression showcases how intrinsically linked the partisan
political system is to micro-social civic culture.141
To understand the identity of Golden Dawn as a political party, it is
necessary to look into the party’s official policies as reflected on its position
documents as well as the public rhetoric and activity it pursues. In terms of
its official ideology, Golden Dawn embraces nationalism as “the third major
ideology of history,” juxtaposing it to communism and liberalism.142 As a
typical extreme right-wing party, Golden Dawn effectively equates the
nation with the state and ethnicity with citizenship. It understands
democracy to mean “rule of the people, and therefore the society that is
comprised of people of common origin.”143 Though Golden Dawn firmly
denies accusations that align it with the interwar period ideologies, it is a
proponent of a form of biological nationalism very much akin to those of
fascism and Nazism. For Golden Dawn, “[n]ationalism sees people not only
as a numerical entity of individuals but as a qualitative synthesis of people
with the same biological and spiritual heritage.”144 The establishment of an
ethnically pure state is not only a goal in itself but will also bring, according
to Golden Dawn, the “radical renewal of the obsolete and counterfeit social
values” that will save the nation from national decadence.145 Furthermore,
Golden Dawn believes that “nationalism is the only absolute and true
139. Gordon Fairclough, Far-Right Party Taps Greek Anger: Anti-Immigrant Golden Dawn Makes
Gains with Voters Frustrated with the Political Establishment, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443624204578056661472836612.
140. George Kassimeris, Greece: The Persistence of Political Terrorism, 89 INT’L AFF. 131, 142
(2013).
141. Gerodimos, supra note 134, at 17–18.
142. Information, POPULAR ASSOCIATION GOLDEN DAWN, http://www.xryshaygh.com/en/
information (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
143. Id., para. 6.
144. Id., para. 12. Party documents point out that ‘the people’ is born from the race, and, according
to party MP and political council member Elias Panagiotaros, the Greek race has particular standards.
According to Golden Dawn, the party does not ignore the law of diversity and difference in Nature.
Respecting the intellectual, national, and racial inequality of humans we can build a just society based on
equality before the law. In the Greek Parliament, Golden Dawn legislator Eleni Zaroulia, who is
Michaliolakos’s wife, accuses the political establishment of ‘equating Greek expatriates with every sort
of subhuman that invaded our country, with various diseases he carries’ Greek Parliament, Minutes of
the plenary session of the Greek parliament (Oct. 18, 2012) 59.
145. Id.
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revolution because it seeks the birth of new ethical, spiritual, social and
mental values.”146 For that reason, Golden Dawn “is not looking to salvage
anything from the installed economic and social interests that lead nations,
peoples and cultures in decline.”147
Finally, Golden Dawn attacks the “corrupt political establishment”
which it sees as selling off Greek sovereignty through the series of
agreements made with the EU and International Monetary Fund to resolve
the issue of the Greek debt crisis.148 In the ideal nationalist state Golden
Dawn strives to establish, “political authority belongs to the People, without
party patrons,” making direct reference to an ideal political system without
space for political parties or parliamentary democracy.149 On the issue of
immigration, Golden Dawn has a firm position of demanding the immediate
deportation of all undocumented immigrants, as well as the criminal
prosecution of those employing immigrants illegally.150 For Golden Dawn,
only people of Greek descent ought to have political rights and the rest
should only have civil rights.151 Party leader Nikos Michaloliakos has made
it clear that the party’s relationship with democratic politics is only tenuous.
At a rally where the party supporters chanted, “blood, honor, and Golden
Dawn”— an adapted Nazi slogan—Michaloliakos declared: “If they want us
to, we can abandon it at any given moment and take to the streets. . . There,
they shall see what the Golden Dawn is really about, they will see what battle
means, they will see what struggle means, they will see what bayonets
sharpened every night mean.”152
In terms of mobilization, Golden Dawn and its members are alleged to
have contributed to the rise of violence against immigrants and antiimmigrant crime in Greece.153 Perhaps one of the most pressing challenges
for Greek domestic security is the sudden increase in activity of violent
extreme right militia-like groups and gangs who target migrants and
perceived migrants.154 Since 2009, Greece has faced what NGOs have

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Information, POPULAR ASSOCIATION GOLDEN DAWN, http://www.xryshaygh.com/en/
information (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
151. Id. (“The ownership of land and property is only for those with full political rights; for those
who only have civil rights, property automatically belongs to the state after the 99th year.”)
152. Eliza Griswold, Dawn of the Dead, 243 NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 8, 2012, at 23.
153. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 120, at 36–41 (July 2012).
154. Sappho Xenakis, Violent Extremism in Greece: Focusing on the Far-Right, OPEN DEMOCRACY
(Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.opendemocracy.net/sappho-xenakis/violent-extremism-in-greece-focusingon-far-right.
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labeled as “the steepest ascent in racist violence in Europe.”155 Within the
first half of 2011, NGOs in Athens report to have treated at least 500 victims
of “racist attacks,” the equivalent of hate crimes in the Greek criminal code,
with more than 200 additional racist attacks recorded between October 2011
and December 2012.156 In late 2012, the UNHCR called the level of racist
violence “alarming,” while the US Embassy in Athens went so far as to warn
US citizens residing in or travelling to Greece of a heightened risk of attack
for those whose complexion “might have them perceived as foreign
migrants.”157 While several Golden Dawn candidates and Members of the
Parliament have been detained by the police and brought to trial for attacks
against immigrants during ‘cleansing’ operations throughout Athens, the
party officially denies any direct involvement in these violent incidents.158
These operations include many organized acts of violence that commonly
cause serious bodily harm and are typically perpetrated by black-clad
vigilante groups who identify with the party.159 Golden Dawn’s leader
Michaloliakos told Human Rights Watch that while “there is no organic
relationship between Golden Dawn and these groups, we support their
activities. Not illegal activities, however … [m]any of their members voted
for us, and members of Golden Dawn belong to these groups, but the crimes
don’t come from these groups.”160
The foray into parliamentary politics did not cause Golden Dawn to
tone down its fierce rhetoric and alleged violent activities, which have since
escalated. Golden Dawn’s leading figures are alleged to have taken part in
violent attacks and persistent accusations have been made that Golden Dawn
is the mobilizing force behind these attacks.161 Party members have also
been implicated in specific attacks. Party Member of Parliament Elias
Kasidiaris gained worldwide notoriety when he assaulted two female
political opponents on national television.162 MPs George Germenis, Elias
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. E.g., Golden Dawn Trial Enters Next Phase, EKATHIMERINI (Feb. 8, 2018),
http://www.ekathimerini.com/225644/article/ekathimerini/news/golden-dawn-trial-enters-next-phase;
Dimitris Christopoulos, The Golden Dawn Trial: A Major Event for Democracy in Greece and Beyond,
OPENDEMOCRACY (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.opendemocracy.net/dimitris-christopoulos/he-goldendawn-trial-major-event-for-democracy-in-greece-and-beyond; The Trial: Documentation and
Monitoring, GOLDEN DAWN WATCH, http://goldendawnwatch.org/?page_id=420&lang=en (last visited
Oct. 21. 2018).
159. Xenakis, supra note 154.
160. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 120, at 40 (citing Human Rights Watch interview with
Michaloliakos, Athens, January 12, 2012).
161. GOLDEN DAWN WATCH, supra note 158.
162. Smith, supra note 125.

BANTEKA (DO NOT DELETE)

156

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

2/5/2019 1:31 PM

[Vol 29:127

Panagiotaros and Constantinos Barbarousis led a group of Golden Dawn
members in Rafina and Mesologgi against immigrant merchants.163 After
forcefully requesting the merchants to verify whether they had permits, the
Golden Dawn members overturned market stalls with their Greek
flagpoles.164 Themis Skordeli, one of the three people standing trial for the
September 2011 stabbing of an Afghan asylum seeker, was on the Golden
Dawn ballot in the most recent municipal elections but was not elected.165
Two MPs were detained, along with the daughter of a Golden Dawn leader,
and questioned by the police in connection with anti-immigrant violence
during a Golden Dawn rally though they were released without charge.166
Golden Dawn has distributed flyers outside gay clubs in Athens reading,
“after the immigrants, you’re next.”167 Finally, following an investigation
into the murder of Pavlos Fyssas in 2013 by a Golden Dawn supporter, the
leader and several Golden Dawn MPs were arrested in 2015 on suspicion of
forming a criminal organization, and are currently awaiting trial.168
Despite, or perhaps partially because of, these acts of violence, Golden
Dawn’s popularity is substantial. Its perceived role in ‘cleaning up’
neighborhoods of urban centers that have been settled by immigrants and
protecting Greek residents from crime is often cited as one of the party’s
success factors.169 Moreover, in the eyes of its voters and supporters, Golden
Dawn has assumed some of the social services that have been abandoned by
the Greek state, which has been in a tumultuous financial situation since
2008. Golden Dawn has been reported to provide its supporters with medical
and legal aid, medication, and security, escorting pensioners to banks to cash

163. Giannis Papadopoulos, The Raid was Considered a Ceremonial Visit, KATHIMERINI (Nov. 24,
2014),
http://www.kathimerini.gr/793173/interactive/epikairothta/ereynes/h-efodos-kri8hke-e8imoty
pikh-episkeyh.
164. See Griswold, supra note 152, at 23 (“In the town of Rafina, they overturned market stalls
belonging to anyone who didn’t have white skin.”).
165. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 120, at 39.
166. Id.
167. Griswold, supra note 152, at 23.
168. Helena Smith, Golden Dawn Leader Jailed Ahead of Greek Criminal Trial, THE GUARDIAN
(Oct. 3, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/03/golden-dawn-leader-jailed-nikosmichaloliakos; Helena Smith, Golden Dawn leaders’ trial adjourned until next week. THE GUARDIAN
(May 7, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/07/golden-dawn-leaders-resume-trialgreece.
169. See Liz Alderman, Greek Far Right Hangs a Target on Immigrants, THE NEW YORK TIMES
(Jul. 10, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/world/europe/as-golden-dawn-rises-in-greeceanti-immigrant-violence-follows.html (discussing growing violence and threats against immigrants and
the failure of the government to address such attacks). See generally DANIEL TRILLING, LIGHTS IN THE
DISTANCE: EXILE AND REFUGE AT THE BORDERS OF EUROPE (2018).
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their pensions in order to prevent muggings.170 A separate section on
unemployment on Golden Dawn’s website states that the main reason for the
increasing national unemployment is the large influx of illegal immigrants
who entered Greece mainly in the 1990s, claiming that “for every foreign
worker is a Greek unemployed.”171 Unquestionably, Golden Dawn appeals
to demographics that not only appreciate its “charitable” social activism but
also support the violent activities its name is allegedly tied to. While Golden
Dawn’s presence in the Parliament could offer a disturbing veil of legitimacy
and even carte blanche over these actions, its activities increasingly flirt with
those stipulated in the criminal acts sections of the European Framework
Decision and Directive on combating terrorism as they have been transposed
in the Greek Criminal Code.172
C. A Constitutional Ban or Criminal Liability for Terrorist Activity?
The approach taken throughout Europe in order to stall the growth and
activities of extreme right-wing organizations espousing Nazi or fascist
ideologies is to constrain them through the legal and constitutional
provisions in place.173
European constitutions generally guarantee
individual, civil, and political rights such as freedom of speech and
association granting their citizens the necessary space for the exchange of
ideas, the establishment of necessary unions and organizations, and the
expression of approval or opposition through public association and
demonstration.174 These guarantees are also present in the European
Convention of Human Rights that serves as a supra-constitutional
umbrella.175 However, contrary to the wide scope of the First Amendment
in the U.S. Constitution, regarding rights of speech and association,
European constitutions impose limits on speech and association rights
through the constitution itself or through specific laws that delineate the
170. Alexandra Koronaiou & Alexandros Sakellariou, Reflections on ‘Golden Dawn’, Community
Organizing and Nationalist Solidarity: Helping (Only) Greeks, 48 COMM. DEV. J. 332-338 (2013).
171. Id. at 334.
172. POINIKOS KODIKAS[P.K.][CRIMINAL CODE] [Greek Penal Code] 187A.
173. E.g., GRUNDGESETZ[GG][BASIC LAW], art. 21 para. 2, translation at https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0125; Paul Franz, Unconstitutional and Outlawed Political
Parties: A German-American Comparison, 5 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 51, 56 (1982); Fernando CasalBértoa, Daniela Romée Piccio & Ekaterina Rashkova, Party Law in Comparative Perspective, WORKING
PAPER SERIES ON THE LEGAL REGULATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES, No. 16 (2012); Peter Niesen, Antiextremism, Negative Republicanism, Civic Society: Three Paradigms for Banning Political Parties, Ger.
L. J. 81, 81-112, 94-97 (2002).
174. E.g., BASIC L. FOR THE FED. REPUBLIC OF GER. [CONSTITUTION]; CONSTITUTION OF OCTOBER
4, 1958 (FR.); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS 2008; CONSTITUTION OF THE
ITALIAN REPUBLIC.
175. Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R., https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
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boundaries of permissible action.176 What is more, all EU member states
have enacted laws that prohibit various forms of racism, discrimination,
incitement to hatred, and racial violence.177
In a similar vein, EU Member States allow for the possibility of
constitutional bans on Nazi or fascist parties. All states in Germany had all
agreed in an attempt to ban the National Democratic Party, accused of having
neo-Nazi links in 2003 and 2017.178 The European Commission against
racism and intolerance of the Council of Europe has recommended that
Greece consider banning Golden Dawn.179 However, despite the
understandable temptation to ban extremist political parties, such a decision
would not come without consequences. It raises obvious issues regarding
balanced restrictions on freedom of speech as well as political assembly and
participation. Banning such political parties may do little to change the minds
of these parties’ supporters or decrease their influence. If anything, a ban
could drive such parties underground, giving them much more space for the
pursuit of illegal and violent activities, and could end up strengthening the
fanaticism of their supporters. It could plausibly further increase the
attractiveness of violence as a form of political expression if the party is no
longer given the opportunity to participate in democratic politics and
peaceful alternatives to violence.180 Instead, if the party is not banned from
political participation, Golden Dawn political leaders involved in criminal
activity could have their parliamentary immunity withdrawn, where
appropriate, for individual prosecutions to take place. While it is certainly
debatable how effective such prosecutions would be in addressing the threats
of violence and terror by members and supporters, this does not mean that
prosecutions are an ineffective tool for addressing such incidents. It may also
be necessary to implement additional special measures or restrictions that
would facilitate effective prosecutions and to sanction any unconstitutional

176. Banning the NPD: German Governors Agree on Legal Challenge, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Dec. 6,
2012,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-governors-agree-on-legal-bid-to-ban-farright-npd-party-a-871440.html.
177. Council of Eur., Anti-Racism Monitors Urge Action against Greece’s Neo-Nazi Golden Dawn
Party (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.humanrightseurope.org/2012/12/anti-racism-monitors-urge-actionagainst-greece%E2%80%99s-neo-nazi-golden-dawn-party.
178. Melissa Eddy, German Court Rejects Effort to Ban Neo-Nazi Party, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 17,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/world/europe/german-court-far-right.html.
179. Leaked Council of Europe Report Suggests Greece Could Ban Golden Dawn, EKATHIMERINI
(Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_15/04/2013_493932.
180. See Bert Klandermans & Nonna Mayer, Context, alliances and conflict, in EXTREME RIGHT
ACTIVISTS IN EUROPE 28, 30–31 (Bert Klandermans & Nonna Mayer eds., 2006) (discussing the political
opportunities of extreme right parties).
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speech or activities and expressions of terror and hostility on behalf of the
party.181
Golden Dawn is a party whose members dress in black and use rhetoric
of violence and imagery that is reminiscent of Nazism and fascism while
being openly skeptical about parliamentary democracy. The party publicly
expresses opinions of racism, anti-Semitism, and homophobia. But is this
enough to make the argument that Golden Dawn performs terrorist
activities? For Golden Dawn’s activities to qualify as criminal terrorist
activities in accordance with Article 3 of the Directive on combating
terrorism, Golden Dawn needs to be recognized as a legal person and its
attributed activities must align with those enumerated in the Directive as it
has been transposed in Greek criminal law.182 For purposes of
harmonization, Greece has implemented the provisions of the earlier
Framework Decision in Article 187A of the Greek Criminal Code.183
Human Rights NGOs have long campaigned for the Greek state to
recognize and treat extreme right-wing violence as a danger to security and
public safety. Nonetheless, public officials have, for the most part, rejected
the idea that such violence is a serious problem despite the growing number
of incidents reported by NGOs. They have failed to monitor and effectively
address such attacks by arresting and prosecuting perpetrators or by
compensating victims.184 It was not until NGOs drew international attention
to extreme right-wing violence in Greece in the global media that the Greek
state appointed a special prosecutor in January 2013 to deal with these
crimes.185 On the Athenian streets however, it is now common knowledge
among Greeks and immigrants alike that black clothes are the unofficial
uniform of Golden Dawn. Some of the violent acts have been captured on
video and have conveniently been posted on Golden Dawn’s official
YouTube channel, thus confirming the reported attacks from NGOs.186
Unquestionably, many of the acts attributed to Golden Dawn could
serve the aim of threatening or seriously intimidating a population and are
often attacks against a person’s life as well as physical integrity, thus meeting
the intent requirement of terrorism under the Directive.187 Under the flexible
interpretation of the endangerment explained above, the acts listed in Article
181. See id. at 33 (discussing the politial legal environment in European countries).
182. See Directive 2017/541, supra note 65, art. 3 (defining “terrorist offences” under the Directive).
183. Poinikos Kodikas [PK] [Penal Code] 187A (Greece).
184. Sappho Xenakis, Violent Extremism in Greece: Focusing on the Far-Right, OPEN DEMOCRACY
(Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.opendemocracy.net/sappho-xenakis/violent-extremism-in-greece-focusingon-far-right.
185. Id.
186. Griswold, supra note 152, at 22.
187. Directive 2017/541, supra note 65, art. 3.
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3 of the Directive are inherently able to seriously damage a country or go
against a state’s ability to provide protection for life and limb towards its
citizens.188 The perpetrator’s intent represents the decisive point in
determining whether an offense may be qualified as terrorism, which ought
to be determined by a court in order to establish criminal liability. To do so,
a court would first have to decide whether political parties have legal
personality in order to incur criminal liability for terrorist offenses. Under
Greek Constitutional Law, there is no concrete definition for either the form
or actions of a political party but only a general legal framework within
which the political party ought to serve the democratic regime.189
Greek scholarship and jurisprudence are divided over the issue of
whether political parties have legal personality. Dominant jurisprudence
holds that political parties are not legal persons but instead public law
institutions subject to special rights, responsibilities and action through their
organs.190 This is because legal persons under Greek law are only those that
become so after a specific typical procedure as is required by law.191 No
such provision can be found in either constitutional or civil law to support
the existence of legal personality for political parties. Additionally, a
combination of historic and teleological interpretation of the Greek
Constitution shows that the legislature, under the shadow of the 1974
military junta, intended to entrust political parties with as much freedom of
organization and activity as possible. Any additional legal provision
imposing specific procedures of organization and activity would infringe
upon such freedom. Under this understanding, political parties are neither
legal persons nor simple unions but instead sui generis political institutions
subject to specific rights and responsibilities under public law that attach to
the goal of their original establishment as contributors to the democratic
regime.
Against this dominant theory, the argument has been raised that
political parties are, in fact, legal persons. First, this argument interprets
Article 29 of the Greek Constitution in conjunction with other Constitutional
and legal provisions as specifying a procedure for the acquisition of legal
personality by political parties.192 Accordingly, Article 72 of the
Constitution proscribes the procedure for the adoption of a law regarding the
188. See id. (listing acts that constitute terrorist offenses, including “attacks upon a person’s life
which may cause death” and “interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other
fundamental natural resource, the effect of which is to endanger human life”).
189. 2008 Syntagma [Syn.] [Constitution] 3 (Greece).
190. 2145/79 STE decision, 600.
191. Astikos Kodikas [A.K.] [Civil Code] 4:61 (Greece).
192. See 2008 Syntagma [Syn.] [Constitution] 2, 3 (Greece); Diatagma (1974:59) Presidential
Decree, art. 1 (Greece); Diatagma (1974:650) Presidential Decree, art. 3, 34, 37 (Greece).
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operation of political parties.193 Additionally, under Greek law, political
parties may not undertake any activity until the deposition by the leader of
the party to the Supreme Court of Greece declaring the party’s opposition to
any act that could overturn the democratic regime or reflect violent
acquisition of power.194 This procedure could indeed be seen as establishing
a process similar to the acquisition of legal personality or it could merely be
interpreted as a guarantor framework for Article 29 of the Constitution,
which establishes the procedures for establishment and organization of
political parties.195 Similarly, other legal procedures refer to political parties’
obligations to declare their name and emblem to the President of the
Parliament as well as the Supreme Court in order to be given permission to
partake in upcoming elections.196 As a political party may not merely be a
union, the principles of procedural safeguards could dictate the necessity for
political parties to bear legal personality.
Second, this argument is also based on the original silence of the
Constitution regarding the legal nature of political parties. Accordingly, this
silence is not to be interpreted as purposely avoiding a strict legal framework
but instead as foreseeing the need for progressive development of the notion
of political party in order to enjoy legally guaranteed structures for its
activities not only in the field of public law but also in private law. Naturally,
this institutional framework could not interfere with the political parties’
freedom of action toward their democratic goals, but so long as there is no
infringement on this freedom, political parties ought to enjoy legal
personality. Until the issue is clarified through constitutional amendment or
law, the potential liability of political parties for terrorist activity as
prescribed by Article 3 of the Directive on combating terrorism currently
remains only an argument of speculation.
If we were to assume, arguendo, that political parties indeed enjoy legal
personality, then provided the act in question meets the definitional
requirements, a test of attribution would be necessary in order to link the act
to the political party. Naturally, the level of attribution is dependent on the
potential perpetrator and his or her level of active contribution towards the
party in order to satisfy the first attribution element of Article 17 of the

193. 2008 Syntagma [Syn.] [Constitution] 3 (Greece)
194. Diatagma (1974:59) Presidential Decree, art. 2 (Greece).
195. 2008 Syntagma [Syn.] [Constitution] 2 (Greece).
196. See, e.g., Andrew Marszal, Golden Dawn Free to Appear on European Parliament Election
Ballots in Greece, TELEGRAPH, (May 11, 2014), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
europe/greece/10823857/Golden-Dawn-free-to-appear-on-European-Parliament-election-ballots-inGreece.html (discussing the Greek Supreme Court’s decision to recognize Golden Dawn as a political
party).
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Directive.197 However, under the second attribution element of Article 17,
legal persons are also to be held liable by omission, if their lack of
supervision or control led to the commission of the terrorist act.198 Even if
the higher attribution standard of direct link could not be met for either
evidentiary reasons or lack of leadership participation in the act, liability by
omission could be established. If political parties were considered to be legal
persons, activities that fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Directive could
not only lead to individual liability, but they could also lead to collective
liability on the part of Golden Dawn as an organization bearing legal
personality provided the necessary attribution standard is met.
CONCLUSION
This article has sought to draw attention to the resurgence of extreme
right-wing parties and the relationship between right-wing extremism,
political parties, and terrorism. In this light, the article set out to substantiate
three primary claims. First, it argued that right-wing extremism is the
product of a delegitimization process against the political status quo. This
delegitimization created fertile ground for the institutionalization and
mainstreaming of political organizations reflecting extreme right-wing
ideologies. These new or evolved political organizations have a different
approach and rhetoric towards liberal democracy than their predecessors,
one that is not directly against it but rather capitalizes on the benefits offered
by the liberal state to advance their agendas. Second, this article argued that
several of the activities of these political organizations may qualify as
terrorist offenses despite the definitional ambiguity of the crime of terrorism
using the most recent EU Directive on combatting terrorism, and liberally
interpreting its endangerment requirement. Finally, the article focused on
the illustrative case of Golden Dawn and its association with nationalist
violence in order to examine a constitutional interpretation that would grant
political parties in Greece the necessary legal personality in order to incur
collective criminal liability for such criminal activities.
Naturally, the issues raised in this article are not only legal but also
heavily social and political. However, this article, if nothing else, has
attempted to shift the discussion from one of descriptive analysis of rightwing extremism to one of legal evaluation of activities within the ambit of
the recent criminalization of terrorism. Continued disregard for the new
political developments threatening liberal democracy and a lack of a
systematic approach through the criminal justice system to the criminal and

197. Directive 2017/541, art. 17, supra note 65.
198. Id.
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terrorizing activities of these political organizations threaten to legitimize
and perpetuate cultures of violence that can destabilize and delegitimize
liberal institutions and democratic values.

